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No HARM, No FOUL: CALCULATION OF
NONDISCHARGEABLE DAMAGES IN
TRANSACTIONS TAINTED BY FRAUD
Theresa J. Pulley Radwan*
I. INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHETICAL
A. THE PROBLEM OF RENEWED DEBT AND SECTION 523(A)(2)(B) 1
TEPHEN and Sarah Dawson are a young married couple. To-
gether, they have a gross income of about $50,000 per year.2 When
Stephen and Sarah needed to purchase a new car a few years ago,
they obtained a $20,000 loan from the local bank ("Bank"). In connec-
tion with the loan application, the Dawsons were required to submit a
number of forms and financial statements. They filled out the documents
completely and honestly. The Bank granted them the loan, secured by
the car, with payment due over the next five years. As part of the loan
agreement, the Bank required the Dawsons to provide new financial
* D2005, Theresa J. Pulley Radwan-Associate Dean of Academics and Associate
Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. This research was supported by a
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assistance in preparing this article. In addition, she is grateful for the support and encour-
agement of her colleagues, particularly Dean Darby Dickerson, Professors Kristen Adams,
Michael Allen, Brooke Bowman, James Fox, Royal C. Gardner, Cynthia Hawkins-Leon,
and James Underwood.
1. Though the majority of cases considering this issue deal with honest debt later
tainted by fraud, cases have considered the issue in reverse. In Jennen v. Hunter (In re
Hunter), 771 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1985), the debtor fraudulently convinced Jennen to invest
in property. Id. at 1131. Though the money was actually invested in property, the debtor
did not reveal the nature of the property to Jennen. Id. at 1128. The debtor then
convinced Jennen to send more money to pay property taxes; Jennen did so, and the
debtor actually used the money to pay the taxes as promised. Id. at 1127. Thus, debtor
incurred the first debt fraudulently but the second debt honestly. Id. at 1129-30. The
Eighth Circuit did not reconsider the issue of dischargeability already decided by the
bankruptcy court-the first debt was deemed nondischargeable, but the second
dischargeable. Id. at 1127. Rather, the circuit court only considered how to divide the
proceeds from the sale of the property in bankruptcy between the dischargeable and
nondischargeable debts. Id. at 1128. Ultimately, the court opted for a pro-rata distribution
between the debts. Id. at 1130. The court also held that attorneys' fees incurred in
collecting on the fraud debt were part of the fraud claim and, thus, nondischargeable. Id.
at 1131. See also Central National Bank & Trust Co. v. Liming (In re Liming), 797 F.2d 895
(10th Cir. 1986), in which the court held that the original, fraudulently incurred, loan later
renewed honestly could be nondischargeable.
2. The average household income in the United States from 2001 through 2003 was
$43,527. U.S. Census Bureau, Income 2003, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/in-
come03/statemhi.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
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statements every year. If the financial statements indicated a problem
with the Dawsons' financial condition, the Bank could call the loan forc-
ing the Dawsons to pay the remainder due immediately or face reposses-
sion of the car under state law.3 In addition, the Dawsons were required
to verify annually that they had insurance covering the replacement value
of the car and that they had no significant new debt.
One year after borrowing the money, Sarah and Stephen were ready to
submit their first annual financial statements. Unfortunately, due to Sa-
rah's poor driving record and excessive number of speeding tickets, the
Dawsons' insurance provider recently cancelled their automobile insur-
ance. Consider the different outcomes resulting from the Dawsons' po-
tentially reporting the insurance cancellation to the Bank. If the
Dawsons fraudulently failed to report the lack of insurance, the Bank
would not cancel the Dawsons' loan or take action to otherwise protect
itself. Conversely, if the Dawsons did report the cancellation of insur-
ance, the Bank could protect itself by purchasing insurance on the car (at
the Dawsons' expense, of course) or calling the loan.
Six months after the Dawsons submitted their first statements, Sarah
caused a devastating accident. The Dawsons' car sustained significant
damage and, though still driveable, was basically worthless. Sarah was
also personally responsible for many of the debts caused by the accident.
In addition, though Sarah had medical insurance, the Dawsons were left
with thousands of dollars in deductibles and other expenses not covered
by the health insurer.
When the time came for the Dawsons to submit their second annual
financial statements to the Bank, they neglected to mention the accident,
though the statements required them to verify the value of the automo-
bile. The financial statements also required them to disclose potential
and actual liabilities, but the Dawsons failed to mention the debts in-
curred as a result of the accident. The Bank employee in charge of the
Dawsons' loan received the documents, quickly looked through them,
and placed them in the Dawsons' file.
Before long, the Dawsons realized that Sarah's accident had changed
them forever, personally and financially. They tried to pay the debts, but
they simply could not afford to pay hospital bills, car payments, and all of
their other obligations. On top of that, the insurers for the others in-
volved in the accident filed a lawsuit against the Dawsons to pay the auto-
mobile and medical claims of the others involved in the accident. Under
significant financial pressure, Sarah and Stephen filed for chapter 7 bank-
3. See UCC § 9-601(a)(1) (2000) (allowing secured party to foreclose on collateral
after a default); id. § 9-601 cmt. 3 (noting that parties may contract as to when a default
occurs). Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code has been substantially
adopted by every state. Uniform Law Commissioners, Facts About the Revised UCC Arti-
cle 9, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca9.asp (last
visited Sept. 20, 2005).
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ruptcy protection. 4 When the Bank officer received copies of Sarah and
Stephen's financial statements filed with the bankruptcy court, he was
stunned to find out about the accident and the lawsuits against Sarah and
Stephen. The Bank knows that, as a secured creditor in a bankruptcy, it
receives the value of the car,5 but the Dawsons, only two years into a five-
year loan, still owe nearly $15,000 to the Bank, and the car's value van-
ished after the accident. The Dawsons' other assets will, for the most
part, be exempt 6 from creditors or of little value. If the Dawsons had
notified the Bank of the insurance cancellation and the Bank purchased
replacement insurance, the Bank may be able to obtain some money
from the insurance company (though likely less than the value of the loan
because the debt likely exceeds the value of the car) but will lose the
remainder of its claim. If the Dawsons did not make the Bank aware of
the insurance cancellations, there will be no insurance money to collect.
The Bank faces the possibility that most of the money owed by the Daw-
sons will be discharged 7 in bankruptcy and will never be repaid.
Though the Bank's situation looks bleak, it may find salvation in sec-
tion 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code ("Code"), which provides for excep-
tions to discharge of the debts of a debtor. Section 523(a)(2) provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b)
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or
refinancing of credit, to the extent obtained by -
(B) use of a statement in writing -
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for
such money, propefty, services, or credit reasonably re-
lied; and
(iv) that the debtor cause to be made or published with in-
tent to deceive[.] 8
Though section 523(a)(2) provides for other "fraud" exceptions to dis-
4. Unforeseen medical expenses constitute one of the primary reasons for bank-
ruptcy filings. H.R. REP. No. 108-40, at 561 (2003); but cf. Edith H. Jones & Todd J.
Zywicki, It's Time for Means-Testing, 1999 BYU L. REV. 177, 242 (1999) (arguing that
medical expenses are not necessarily a substantial cause of bankruptcy filings and do not
explain the rapid increase in the number of bankruptcy filings), cited in Todd J. Zywicki,
Bankruptcy Law as Social Legislation, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 393, 399 n.30 (2001).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2005).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b), (c) (providing that debtors in bankruptcy may take some
types of property out of the bankruptcy estate, based either on federal or state law, making
it unavailable to satisfy claims of creditors).
7. Sections 727(a), 1141(d), 1228(a), and 1328(a) of the Code provide that debts not
paid through the bankruptcy proceeding will be discharged after the conclusion of the
bankruptcy. A creditor may not collect on a discharged debt. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
8. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2005) (emphasis added).
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chargeability, those sections apply to unwritten fraud 9 and to certain
forms of implied fraud. 10 Thus, in most situations involving loans incurred
honestly but renewed fraudulently, a written financial statement will
render the nondischargeability of the loan debt a section 523(a)(2)(B)
question.11
B. THE DELICATE BALANCE OF DISCHARGE
Congress designed section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code to protect cred-
itors.12 However, Congress designed the Bankruptcy Code as a whole to
balance protection for both debtors and creditors. 13 These policies com-
pete throughout the Code. On the one hand, bankruptcy protects debt-
ors by providing them with a "fresh start" unencumbered by obligations
9. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (prohibiting discharge for debts incurred through "false
pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition") (emphasis added).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C) (prohibiting discharge for significant amounts of "luxury"
purchases).
11. Some cases involve both written financial statements and oral statements. For one
case with an interesting factual background, see European American Bank v. Gitelman (In
re Gitelman), 74 B.R. 492 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987). Richard and Barbara Gitelman ran
multiple businesses, which borrowed money from the bank under a revolving credit line.
Id. at 493. The debtors were required to provide financial statements to the bank each
year. Id. The decision does not clearly indicate whether the loan was originally taken out
honestly, but it clearly presents a picture of "continuing fraud" on the bank, in which "the
debtors' actions and interim financial statements created an artificial facade which con-
cealed an empty shell, a facade which gave [the bank] a false sense of security and induced
[the bank] to renew and increase [debtors'] line of credit." Id. For example, Mr. Gitelman
provided loans to the company that could be reflected on the financial statements as assets
of the company, only to take the money out of the company one month later. Id. at 493-94.
The debtors listed assets that they did not actually have, and borrowed money for the
company without so disclosing to the bank. Id. at 494. Finally, the debtors moved, selling
the house that guaranteed the Debtors' loan, without informing the bank. Id. at 495. The
Bank renewed and increased the line of credit twice on the basis of these fraudulent state-
ments. Id. at 494. Citing section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Code, the court found fraud and
denied discharge of the entire debt. Id. at 497. The court did not, however, expressly con-
sider whether to imply a damages requirement under section 523(a)(2).
Takeuchi v. Fields (In re Fields), 44 B.R. 322 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984), provides an equally
interesting example. The Fields' company purchased six backhoes from Takeuchi; the back-
hoes could not be sold without Takeuchi's permission. Id. at 324-25. Of course, Fields sold
some of the backhoes. Id. at 325-26. When warned that a Takeuchi representative would
be visiting the Fields' company, Fields contacted the purchasers of the backhoes and in-
duced them to return the backhoes by falsely claiming a problem with the equipment. Id.
at 326. No one informed the Takeuchi representative visiting of the sales. Id. at 324-26.
The court held that the Fields' silence constituted a fraudulent misrepresentation under
section 523(a)(2)(A), which rendered the debt nondischargeable. Id. at 329. The court
noted, however, that Takeuchi might have had a remedy available to it at the time of the
fraudulent sales that was no longer available when the bankruptcy was filed, and that
"Takeuchi suffered damage and loss" as a result. Id.
12. Merav Biton, Lies, Filthy Lies and Archer v. Warner: Should We Allow Fraudulent
Debtors to Side-step Section 523(a)(2)(A)?, 11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 267, 278 (2003);
Robert C. Yan, Note, The Sign Says "Help Wanted, Inquire Within"--But It May Not Mat-
ter if You Have Ever Filed (or Plan to File) for Bankruptcy, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
429, 432 (2002).
13. Yan, supra note 12, at 432.
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of the past.14 The fresh start 15 relies on the ability to discharge debts.' 6
The Code also ensures that a debtor cannot abuse that fresh start to the
detriment of creditors. 17 Exceptions to discharge help ensure that debt-
ors cannot unduly harm creditors via bankruptcy.1 8
Exceptions to discharge occur in one of two ways: either a general de-
nial of discharge altogether 19 or the denial of discharge of specific
debts.20 Section 727 of the Code provides grounds for which a debtor will
be denied discharge altogether. 21 Because of the severity of section 727,
which completely denies a debtor's fresh start, the grounds for section
727 are equally extreme. 22
Section 523 provides a less-severe remedy for creditors. The grounds
for nondischargeability in section 523 lead to a denial of discharge only
for those creditors who have been wronged, 23 or who are owed debts
that, for policy reasons, should not be discharged. 24 Section 523 epito-
14. See Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Domino Effect: The Continued Existence of Liabil-
ity for Fraud in Bankruptcy Despite Good-Faith Settlement by the Honestly Unfortunate
Settlor, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 81, 84 (2003) (citing FCC v. NextWave Pers. Comm., Inc., 527
U.S. 293 (2000)); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286-87 (1991); Boston Univ. v. Mehta (In
re Mehta), 310 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 2002).
15. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 125 (1977) ("The two most important aspects of the fresh
start available under the Bankruptcy laws are the provision of adequate property for a
return to normal life, and the discharge, with the release from creditor collection attempts.
Current law is deficient in both of these areas.").
16. The discharge of debt in bankruptcy essentially renders the debt nonexistent. It
can no longer be collected or adjudicated. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (2005).
17. See Grogan, 298 U.S. at 286-87 (noting that Code gives debtors ability to start
anew, but only "honest but unfortunate debtor[s]"); see also Honorable Nancy C. Dreher
& Matthew E. Roy, Bankruptcy Fraud and Nondischargeability Under Section 523 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 69 N.D. L. REV. 57, 58 (1993) (noting that discharge only allows honest
persons to avoid debt).
18. Craig A. Bruens, Melting the Plastic Theories: Advocating the Common Law of
Fraud in Credit Card Nondischargeability Actions Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(A)(2)(A), 50
VAND. L. REV. 1257, 1262 (1997) (indicating that section 523 balances concerns of debtors
and creditors).
19. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a), 1141(d)(3) (2005).
20. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
21. These grounds include that "debtor is not an individual," debtor fraudulently con-
cealed property, debtor destroyed or falsified information, debtor defrauded the court,
debtor cannot explain the loss of property, debtor fails to obey a court order, debtor has
received a discharge recently, or debtor voluntarily waives discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
22. Id.
23. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(1) (2005) (unfiled or fraudulent tax obligations); (2) (fraud
debts); (3) (unscheduled debts); (4) (fiduciary fraud); (6) ("willful or malicious injury"); (7)
(fines owed to government); (9) (DUI); (11) (bank fiduciary); (19) (securities fraud).
24. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(5) (alimony, maintenance, or child support); (8) (student
loans); (10) (previously denied discharge); (18) (federal restitution); (14) (loan to pay tax
debt); (15) (divorce property settlement), (16) (condo association fees); (17) (court fees);
(18) (support owed under Social Security Act). Some of these categories of debt could
invoke repayment obligations both because the creditor was wronged and because society
views the debt as significant. But see NATHALIE MARTIN, THE GLANNON GUIDE TO BANK-
RUPTCY: LEARNING BANKRUPTCY THROUGH MULTIPLE-CHOICE QUESTIONS AND ANALY-
sIs 135 (2005), which distinguishes the reasons for nondischargeability of debts based on
which are granted discharge in the various bankruptcy chapters (noting that
[n]on-dischargeable debts include debts incurred by fraud, debts for luxury
goods purchased within 60 days of the filing, certain property settlement
debts owed to spouses, debts neither listed nor scheduled in the bankruptcy
2005] 1389
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mizes balance. The debtor still, for the most part, starts fresh after bank-
ruptcy, but the truly harmed creditors are protected. However, before
determining how much of an honestly-incurred debt that is later tainted
by fraud can be discharged, one must determine whether the fraudulent
statement provided after incurrence of the debt can invoke the provisions
of section 523(a)(2).
C. THE THRESHOLD ISSUE: WHETHER EXTENSION OR RENEWAL OF A
DEBT CONSTITUTES OBTAINING MONEY
With fraudulently incurred debt, courts have little problem determining
that the debtor received money via fraud, and thus, the debt cannot be
discharged. A more complicated issue arises when the debtor did not
actually receive additional cash 25 as a result of the fraud. In other words,
the debtor provided the fraudulent statements, and in exchange, the
lender did not collect on an already-outstanding and honestly incurred
loan. Almost every court that has considered the issue has determined
that fraud in such a situation invokes section 523(a)(2) because the plain
language of the Code prohibits discharge for "money, property, services,
or an extension, renewal, or refinancing" if incurred as a result of fraud.2 6
Thus, courts have determined that the willingness of the lender to con-
tinue to loan money to the debtor, rather than calling the loan, consti-
paperwork, debts for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity,
and debts arising from embezzlement or larceny [may be discharged in a
chapter 13 bankruptcy and] [s]ome . . . debts are excepted from discharge
because society has decided that these are the types of debts that people
should be obligated to pay no matter what.. [and] include alimony and child
support, debts for recent taxes and some other taxes regardless of age, debts
resulting from criminal restitution claims, debts arising while driving under
the influence of alcohol, and student loans".).
However, this distinction is less clear now that Chapter 13 discharges have become more
limited. See Bankruptcy Fraud Prevention & Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Pub. L.
109-08).
25. Actually, in many cases, the debtor receives additional cash as a result of the fraud,
but also continues to owe money under an original debt incurred before the fraud. Many
early cases, and even some more recent cases, considering this issue dealt with this dichot-
omy under the "new cash" doctrine, limiting the nondischargeable debt to the amount of
"new cash" obtained as a result of the fraud, and discharging the renewed debt. Beneficial
Mortgage Co. of Ohio v. Rollman (In re Rollman), 223 B.R. 111 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998);
Family Fed. Credit Union v. Schuster (In re Schuster), 69 B.R. 352 (Bankr. Conn. 1987); In
re Gadberry, 37 B.R. 752 (Bankr. Ill. 1984); Regency Nat'l Bank v. Blatz (In re Blatz), 37
BR. 401 (Bankr. Wis. 1984).
26. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (emphasis added); see, e.g., First Commercial Bank v. Robin-
son (In re Robinson), 192 B.R. 569 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (bank's forebearance from
collection on debt qualifies as an extension of credit to the debtor); First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Largo v. Mancini (In re Mancini), 77 B.R. 913 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987 (same); but
see Fleming v. Preston (In re Preston), 47 B.R. 354 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding that payment
of a debt with a bounced check does not create fraud nondischargeability, even if payment
temporarily caused bank not to call loan immediately); Drinker Biddle & Reath v. Bacher
(In re Bacher), 47 B.R. 825 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (finding that forebearance does not
invoke section 523(a)(2)(A) without significant analysis); Ballard v. Grubbs (In re
Grubbs), 9 B.R. 499 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (finding that forebearance does not create
claim of nondischargeability under 523(a)(2)(A) unless it involves a new extension of
credit).
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tutes a grant of credit sufficient to invoke the protections of section
523(a)(2). 27 Assuming that the creditor's willingness to extend a loan or
not to collect on a loan as a result of fraudulent statements provided after
origination of the loan invokes section 523(a)(2), the next question be-
comes how much of the loan qualifies for nondischargeability. Is the en-
tire loan or only the actual damages caused by the fraud
nondischargeable, and if the latter, how will the actual damages be
calculated?
II. THE CAUSATION AND DAMAGES ISSUE: DOES AND
SHOULD SECTION 523(A)(2)(B) REQUIRE A
DAMAGE CALCULATION?
What options are available under section 523(a)(2)(B) in a case such as
the Dawson bankruptcy? First, the entire debt can be deemed nondis-
chargeable as a grant of credit to the debtor on the basis of a fraudulent
financial statement.28 Alternatively, only those damages actually caused
by the false financial statement can be discharged. The issue of whether
to discharge any of the debt incurred honestly but renewed fraudulently
comes down to whether section 523(a)(2)(B) includes a requirement that
the creditor was damaged.29 The statute itself provides the obvious start-
ing point for such a determination. 30 To the extent that the statute does
not answer the question, one can consider the legislative history behind
the statute, the case law interpreting the statute, and the policies inherent
in the Code. 3'
A. THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 523(A)(2)
1. Damages v. Causation
Most cases dealing with this issue arise under section 523(a)(2)(B),
which specifically lists the elements required to establish nondis-
chargeability of debt resulting from a fraudulent written financial state-
ment.32 Clearly, none of these requirements expressly includes an
element of damages. Though reliance by the creditor requires a causal
relationship, causation does not equate to damages. Looking beyond
27. Though the author believes that this determination should be based on a case-by-
case determination of the lender's use of the fraudulent statements, for purposes of this
article, it will be assumed that, indeed, the lender would have called the loan had no finan-
cial statements or correct financial statements been given. In other words, but for the
fraudulent financial statements, the lender would have initiated proceedings to repossess
collateral and/or collect against the debtor.
28. See infra Part II(C)(2)(a).
29. See Wolf v. Campbell (In re Campbell), 159 F.3d 963, 964 (6th Cir. 1998).
30. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1989).
31. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85 (2001) (considering text of the
statute, legislative history, and policy before turning to principles of "statutory
construction").
32. Those elements include: reasonable reliance by a creditor on a "materially false"
written statement about the debtor's "financial condition" that the debtor was responsible
for. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2005).
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subsection (B)'s elements, section 523(a)(2) itself has a requirement that
the granting of credit be "obtained by" the fraud.33 Many courts have
considered this language and concluded that this requirement implies a
causation requirement, 34 which, as noted, may already be implicit in sub-
section (B)'s elements.
2. "To the Extent"
The courts seemingly forget that another phrase precedes the "ob-
tained by" phrase-"to the extent." The statute does not need this phrase
to establish a causation requirement. Section 523 could read just as easily
without it: "A discharge... does not discharge an individual debtor from
any debt ... for ... an extension, renewal, or refinancing of credit, ...
obtained by ... use of a [fraudulent] statement in writing . . . ." Given
that every phrase in a statute should be included for a reason,35 one must
consider the effect of including "to the extent" within section 523(a)(2).
The idea of extent necessarily implies a calculation.3 6 But does it imply
a calculation of damages? 37 In section 523(a)(2), "to the extent" modifies
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 66 (1995); Campbell, 159 F.3d at 966; In re
McFarland, 84 F.3d 943, 946 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Shawmut Bank v. Goodrich (In re
Goodrich), 999 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir. 1993)).
35. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995).
36. Black's Law Dictionary defined "obtain" as "[t]o get hold of by effort; to get pos-
session of; to procure; to acquire, any way." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1078 (6th ed.
1990), while defining "extent" as "[a]mount; scope, range; magnitude." Id. at 553.
37. This ability to discharge a portion of the debt, while only retaining the fraudu-
lently-incurred debt post-bankruptcy was recently noted by Judge Richard Posner in Mc-
Clellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890 (7th Cir. 2000). The debtor's brother owed money to
McClellan, taking an unperfected security interest in equipment owned by the brother. Id.
at 892. When McClellan sued for payment, the brother sold the equipment to his sister for
the stated price of $10. Id. at 897. The sister in turn sold the equipment for $160,000 and
declared personal bankruptcy after being named a defendant in the original lawsuit be-
tween McClellan and her brother. Id. at 892. McClellan sought a nondischargeable claim
against the sister in the bankruptcy proceeding. Id. The primary issue in the case involved
the ability to rely on section 523(a)(2)(A)'s false statement provisions when neither the
sister nor the brother had ever actually made a statement to McClellan regarding transfer
of the equipment. Id. After deciding that the "actual fraud" provisions of section 523
sufficed to create nondischargeability, the court turned, in dicta, to the calculation of the
nondischargeable claims:
What is true is that if he had merely defaulted on his original debt to McClel-
lan, which so far as appears was not created by a fraud, and later declared
bankruptcy, that debt would have been dischargeable. If, however, he had
rendered the debt uncollectible by making an actually fraudulent conveyance
of the property that secured it, his actual fraud would give rise to a new debt,
nondischargeable because created by fraud, just as in the case of the sister,
his accomplice in fraud. But it would be a new debt only to the extent of the
value of the security that he conveyed, for that would be the only debt cre-
ated by the fraud itself. For example, if he owed McClellan $100,000 and
defaulted after having transferred to his sister property securing the debt
worth $10,000, he would be entitled to discharge $90,000 of the debt, for only
the $10,000 was a debt created by fraud.
Id. at 895. Thus, though a different factual situation, Judge Posner considers the same ques-
tion: does the later fraud taint the entire debt? In answering "no" to that question, Judge
Posner requires a consideration of the true loss to the Bank as a result of the fraud. The
court, however, goes on to note that, in the case at hand, the sister obtained all of her
1392 [Vol. 58
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"obtained by." Thus, it implies a calculation of the amount of money or
credit actually obtained as a result of the fraud (recalling that refinancing
may be obtained fraudulently). The phrase "to the extent" recognizes
that a creditor, even given the true financial picture, may extend some
credit to a debtor. Assume, for example, a borrower incurred an un-
secured debt of $10,000 based on false financial statements. Had correct
financial statements been provided, the lender would still have permitted
the borrower to borrow $3,000. To what extent was the credit "obtained
by" fraud? Only to the extent of $7,000-the difference between what the
borrower would have received if it had been truthful and what it actually
received by the fraud. This phrase limits causation, rather than providing
a calculation of damages actually incurred by the bank, in that it simply
forces the bank to prove what the fraud actually caused. Yet, it also
serves as a calculation of the loss to the bank, which gave an additional
$7,000 as a result of the fraud.
To highlight how this differs from a true damages calculation, recon-
sider the Dawsons' situation. In so doing, one must consider what would
have happened had the Dawsons been completely truthful at all times
versus what happened with the fraudulent misstatements. When the
Bank was told of the loss of insurance coverage, the Bank purchased re-
placement insurance. When told about the accident and the potential
lawsuits, though, the Bank likely would have called the loan. Assume
further that had the Bank called the loan, the Dawsons would have been
forced to file bankruptcy at that time. What would the Bank have re-
ceived in the Dawson bankruptcy? It would have received the car, or the
value of it, and an unsecured claim for any remaining debt. Recall that
Dawsons owed the Bank $15,000 at the time of the bankruptcy filing;
assume that the value of a car originally purchased for $20,000 two years
ago has decreased to about $10,000. The Bank then holds a $5,000 un-
secured claim.
Compare that with what would have happened had the Dawsons told
the Bank about the insurance coverage, but not about the accident. In
such a situation, the Bank would have purchased insurance coverage for
the car. When the accident occurred, about $10,000 would be recovered
from the insurance carrier. Because the Bank does not know about the
accident, the loan would remain outstanding until the bankruptcy filing.
In the bankruptcy, the Bank would receive the $10,000 in proceeds, as-
suming that they are traceable, leaving it with a $5,000 unsecured claim.
To what extent did their fraud cause the Bank to give credit? Conceiva-
bly, to the extent of the entire outstanding amount of the loan, as without
the fraud, the Bank would not have continued to loan the money. But
what were the Bank's actual damages? Really, it had none. Whether the
Bank knows of the accident or not, it receives the $10,000 in proceeds




from the insurer and a $5,000 unsecured claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Contrast that scenario with what would have happened if the Bank was
not made aware of the cancellation of the insurance coverage or the acci-
dent. After the accident, the car has no value, so Bank could not have
collected its debt by repossessing the car. There are no insurance pro-
ceeds to give to the Bank either. The Bank enters bankruptcy with a
$15,000 unsecured claim, likely to be paid only pennies on the dollar. The
Bank suffers a significant loss. The Bank lent $15,000 on account of the
fraud, but lost $10,000 in payments. The entire "extent" of the debt was
renewed as a result of the fraud, but the loss resulting from the fraud was
only $10,000.
In either scenario, the entire amount of the loan was "reloaned" to the
Dawsons as a result of the fraudulent statements because, had the truth
been known, the Bank would have called the loan in its entirety. How-
ever, the damages differ significantly in the various scenarios. The fraud
regarding the insurance causes the Bank to lose the value of the car.
Though the car accident causes loss to the Bank, the accident itself, not
the failure to disclose the accident, actually causes the loss to the Bank.
Put another way, the Bank's right to collect does not create an ability to
collect. The Bank, in either event, cannot collect the unsecured portion
of its claim against Sarah and Steven unless the Code creates a continuing
right of the Bank to collect post-bankruptcy.
The analysis could stop here. Nothing in section 523(a)(2) expressly
requires that the lender be damaged in order to render a debt nondis-
chargeable. The only language that hints at a damage requirement can be
explained as a limitation on causation instead. However, policy consider-
ations may dictate a different result. Further, this debate has continued
through revisions to section 523(a)(2) and its predecessor, section 17a(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, a consideration of legislative history, case
law, and policy assists in determining whether the current statute could be
considered differently or, if not, whether it should be changed.
B. THE HISTORY BEHIND SECTION 523
Section 523(a)(2)(B) has a long history of development that begins
with the passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1798. Under the Bankruptcy
Act, defrauded creditors had two options available-seek denial of dis-
charge of the individual debt or seek denial of discharge of all of the
debtor's debts.38 Of course, the current Bankruptcy Code allows the same
choice in certain situations. However, the grounds for denial of all debts
are more strict and no longer include fraud in the actual incurrence of
debt.39 Even under the Bankruptcy Act, courts are divided over the issue
38. Household Fin. Corp. v. Danns (In re Danns), 558 F.2d 114, 115 (2d Cir. 1977)
(citing Bankruptcy Act § 14c(3) and § 17a(2)).
39. The grounds for total denial of a debtor's discharge include an institutional debtor,
a debtor who destroyed property, a debtor who falsified information in connection with the
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of whether to discharge debt incurred honestly but renewed
fraudulently.4 °
Congress amended the discharge exceptions, sections 14 and 17, of the
Bankruptcy Act in 1960.41 Courts interpreting the amended provisions
routinely agreed that the new provisions were designed to strike a bal-
ance between debtors and creditors. The new provisions prohibited cred-
itors from seeking a complete denial of debtor's discharge on the basis of
a fraudulently-incurred debt; most courts felt that, in return, they
strengthened the creditor's ability to seek denial of discharge of an indi-
vidual debt.42 However, the effect of the changes in 1960 were not en-
tirely clear. 43 The legislative history, as noted in case law, provided little
guidance:
[tlhe legislative history of this amendment contains the following
statement of the reason for these changes: "The committee believes
that complete denial of a discharge is too severe a penalty in the case
bankruptcy, a debtor who refuses to cooperate with the bankruptcy court, or a debtor
granted prior discharges in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2005). The only references to
fraud in section 727 are found in section 727(a)(2), which denies discharge for a debtor
who "with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged
with custody of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or
concealed . . . property", and section 727(a)(4), which prohibits discharge if "the debtor
knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case . . . made a false oath or
account; presented or used a false claim; gave, offered, received, or attempted to obtain
money .... or withheld from an officer of the estate." Other chapters of the Bankruptcy
Code make section 727 applicable by reference. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)(c). But nothing
in chapter 13 refers to section 727. Rather, limitations on discharge in Chapter 13 are
dictated by reference to section 523 or other sections of the bankruptcy code and include:
payments for which the plan provides post-discharge payment, certain tax claims, fraud
claims, unscheduled claims, fiduciary fraud claims, alimony and other support claims, stu-
dent loan payments, debt due as a result of certain DUI or similar claims, amounts due as a
result of criminal actions, and liability due as a result of a personal injury. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(a). Many categories of nondischargeable debt, including the fraud debt, were ad-
ded to the list of nondischargeable debt under Chapter 13 as a result of the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005; previously, fraud had been dis-
chargeable in a Chapter 13 if the debtor successfully completed the bankruptcy plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1328(a) (pre-2005 version). It is unclear what prompted the change. Cf. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(b), (c) (providing that an uncompleted plan may still permit discharge if failure to
complete plan occurred in good faith and plan cannot reasonably be amended, but dis-
charge will be limited); § 1328(e) (allowing court to revoke discharge during year after
grant of discharge if the discharge itself resulted from fraud).
40. See Danns, 558 F.2d at 115 ("Under the old § 17a(2) where the debtor obtained an
additional loan and signed a new note covering the old balance as well, state courts were
split over whether discharge should be barred for the entire loan or only for the 'fresh
cash."') (citing R. Lewis Townsend, "Fresh Cash"-Another Element of the Bankrupt's
"Fresh Start"?, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 275, 281 n.39 (1977)).
41. Danns, 558 F.2d at 115.
42. Id. ("State courts interpreted this as a compromise whereby the defrauded lender
lost the right to bar the bankrupt's entire discharge, but was still to be entitled to a com-
plete bar of discharge on his own claim.").
43. Not all courts agree that the 1960 amendment and its effects were unclear. See
Local Indus. Fin. Co. v. McDougale, 404 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Ky. Ct. App. 1966) (stating
The language of section 17a(2) is clear and unambiguous. There are no com-
plexities in its terminology. It may well be that we could find the conclusion
of the whole matter in the language of the section itself, and that no prece-
dents or illustrations are necessary to make its exemptions applicable to the
transaction in controversy. But "the world must have emphatic warrant.).
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of the individual noncommercial bankrupt. It is also a penalty which
experience has shown to be subject to abuse.... unscrupulous lend-
ers have frequently condoned, or even encouraged, the issuance of
statements omitting debts with the deliberate intention of obtaining
a false agreement for use in the event that the borrower subse-
quently goes into bankruptcy. '44
While this section clearly indicates a need to protect debtors from prob-
lematic creditors, it does nothing to indicate whether damages are neces-
sary to render a debt nondischargeable. Indeed, courts have used the
language of the 1960 amendments to bolster both sides of the argument. 45
The problem that it references-creditors requesting written financial
statements in the hope that those statements would be inaccurate and
able to serve as the basis for a nondischargeability determination-is not
resolved by changing fraud from the general denial of discharge category
to the individual creditor denial of discharge category. Further, the con-
cern is adequately resolved by the reliance requirement of section 17a of
the Bankruptcy Act and its successor, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
The legislative history also provides that "any obligation incurred as a
result of such a statement is to be nondischargeable. ''46 This statement
provides the closest indication of congressional intent regarding damages.
While it clearly indicates that Congress intends to expand the fraud provi-
sions of the Code beyond just the actual incurrence of debt, the statement
merely indicates the need for a causal relationship between the fraud and
nondischargeability without expressly considering the need, or lack of
need, for damages. Further, it neglects to define an "obligation," though
taken with current section 523(a)(2)'s statement that nondischargeability
applies to more than just the original granting of credit, that definition
may now be supplied.
44. First Am. Nat'l Bank v. Carter (In re Carter), 11 B.R. 992, 993 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1981) (citing Act of June 24, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-621 (74 Stat. 409)).
45. See Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Ellis (In re Ellis), 400 F. Supp. 1112, 1117 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (recognizing that most courts have held entire debt nondischargeable, but finding
nondischargeable only debt "given in reliance upon the false statement," without discuss-
ing damages per se); In re Fuhrman, 385 F. Supp. 1185, 1186 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating "to
except from discharge that portion of the preexisting debt untainted by fraud would be to
render the form rather than the substance of the transaction controlling . . . such a result
would fly in the face of the legislative history of the 1960 amendment"); In re Soika, 365 F.
Supp. 555, 555 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); Seaboard Fin. Co. v. Barnes, 148 N.W.2d 756, 760(Mich. 1967) (same); Household Fin. Corp. v. Walters, 443 P.2d 929, 933 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1968) (same); Budget Fin. Plan v. Haner, 436 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Idaho 1968) (reading
amendments to allow full amount of debt nondischargeable); Liberal Fin. Corp. v. Holley,
157 So. 2d 376, 379-80 (La. Ct. App. 1963) (finding reliance necessary, but without discuss-
ing daniages); Fed. Fin. Co. v. Merkel, 397 P.2d 436, 439-40 (Wash. 1964) (same); First
Credit Corp. v. Wellnitz, 123 N.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Wis. 1963) (same; based on inclusion of
"renewal of credit" language in statute). Many of the cases, however, did not actually
consider whether a damages requirement should be included; rather, they merely consid-
ered whether a renewal of credit could be considered under section 523(a)(2). See, e.g.,
Advance Loan Co. v. Bell, 402 P.2d 944 (N.M. 1965); Family Fin. Corp. v. Lyons, 310
N.Y.S.2d 514, 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (both considering only whether to limit nondis-
chargeability to "fresh cash"); cases cited above.
46. Carter, 11 B.R. at 995 (citing S. RE1'. No. 86-1688, at 2954 (1960)).
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Other changes to the Bankruptcy Act in 1970 and a complete revision
of the Bankruptcy Code in 197847 have affected these precedents.48 Inter-
estingly, the court in In re Schuerman49 recognized that the 1960 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act made changes that most courts determined
made the entire debt nondischargeable. While recognizing these prece-
dents, the court both questioned the validity of this conclusion and noted
that the 1970 amendments made the precedents irrelevant.50 In so doing,
the Schuerman court stressed the policy of uniformity among bankruptcy
courts in dealing with fraud dischargeability. 51 Despite numerous years
of tinkering with the fraud nondischargeability provisions and numerous
precedents concerning section 523(a)(2), "the law in this area still seems
to be unclear." 5
2
The current section 523(a)(2) arose as part of the 1978 creation of the
Bankruptcy Code. Distrust of creditors, a theme shared by the 1960 legis-
lative history, prompted the Bankruptcy Commission to recommend
eliminating section 523(a)(2)(B) altogether. 53 Yet, Congress retained this
exception to dischargeability. 54 Congress made the change to 523(a), not-
ing that a false financial statement does not automatically render the en-
47. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 became
effective Oct. 17, 2005. For purposes of this article, the most significant change under the
Reform Act is the addition of fraud debt to the list of nondischargeable debts under Chap-
ter 13. However, the language of § 523(a) did not change to resolve the issue presented
within.
48. Household Fin. Corp. v. Danns (In re Danns), 558 F.2d 114, 115-16 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating "However, since Congress gave the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over dis-
chargeability questions in 1970, see 11 U.S.C. § 35(c)(1), a large majority of federal courts
and bankruptcy referees have concluded that only that portion of the credit obtained as a
result of a fraudulent statement should be barred from discharge.").
49. 367 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
50. Id. at 1349 ("the advent in 1970 of provisions granting the federal courts exclusive
authority to ascertain the dischargeability of debts ends the necessity for reference to state
laws and institutes another standard of inquiry.") (citing 11 U.S.C. § 35(c) (2005)).
51. Id. (citing 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 38 (2005)).
52. Norwest Fin. N.M., Inc. v. Ojeda (In re Ojeda), 51 B.R. 91, 92 (Bankr. N.M. 1985)
(citing cases that have determined that only new loans actually incurred as a result of fraud
can be discharged as well as cases that prohibit discharge of the entire debt, but ultimately
determining that a creditor must prove that it suffered loss as a result of the fraud).
53. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at n.84 (1979) and surrounding text (citing COMMISSION
REPORT, Pt. I, at 176 & pt. II, at 136):
The threat of litigation over this exception to discharge and its attendant
costs are often enough to induce the debtor to settle for a reduced sum, in
order to avoid the costs of litigation. Thus, creditors with marginal cases are
usually able to have at least part of their claim excepted from discharge (or
reaffirmed), even though the merits of the case are weak. Statistics from a
recent year, for example, show that approximately 8,000 cases were filed
under this exception to discharge. Of those, over 5,000 were settled without
trial. Of the remaining 3,000, creditors won just half. If those 3,000 are repre-
sentative, then it is likely that in 2,500 cases, debtors settled by agreeing to
repay part of the debt, even though they would have won the case had it
gone to trial.
54. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, H.R. 8200 (1979) ("Most of the grounds for denial of dis-
charge concern misconduct by the debtor in the events leading up to the bankruptcy or
during the conduct of the case.").
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tire debt nondischargeable. 55 What the legislative history did not
completely answer was the question of how to calculate the amount of
the nondischargeable debt when the debtor clearly engaged in some
wrongdoing:
The amount of the debt made nondischargeable on account of a false
financial statement is not limited to "new value" extended when a
loan is rolled over. If an initial loan is made subject to a false finan-
cial statement and new money is advanced under a subsequent loan
that is not made under conditions of fraud or false pretenses, then
only the initial amount of the loan made on the original financial
statement is invalidated and excepted from discharge. On the other
hand, where the original financial statement is made under non-
fraudulent conditions and the entire loan in addition to new money is
advanced under a subsequent false financial statement, the entire
loan is made under fraudulent conditions. This rule is sound as a
matter of policy because the creditor relies to his detriment with re-
spect to the entire amount advanced under the false financial state-
ment. Legal rights with respect to the amount previously advanced
may be altered; interest rates may be changed, maturity dates may be
extended, and legal remedies may be foregone in reliance on the new
false financial statement. However, if the terms of the new agreement
are identical to the old agreement with respect to the old money, then
no new money was obtained by a false statement on which the creditor
relied since the creditor's rights were unchanged; therefore, only that
portion of the false financial statement that applied to new money
would be nondischargeable.56
The congressional statement is, at best, unclear and, at worst, contradic-
tory. It begins by presuming that a creditor's renewal of a loan based on
fraudulent financial statements causes detriment to the creditor. It then
goes on to recognize that the many factors creating that detriment to the
creditor may occur. Further, it ends with a situation in which a creditor
will rely on a financial statement but not actually be damaged by it and
not be entitled to nondischargeability. Some congressional intent evinces
from the legislative history. Nondischargeability applies to more thanjust an advance of cash and should include renewals of credit or
forebearance from collecting a debt. A creditor damaged by the fraud
should be entitled to a nondischargeable debt. A creditor not relying on
the false statement should not be entitled to use that false statement to
create nondischargeability. But the question of whether damages are
presumed or must be proven remains open, and to the extent presumed,
the question of rebuttal of that presumption remains unanswered.
Citing the legislative history surrounding the enactment of section
523(a)(2) in the case of North Shore Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Jones (In re
55. 124 CONG. REC. H. 32383 (statements of Congressman Edwards of California,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee
on the Judiciary) ("Under section 523(a)(2)(B)(I) a discharge is barred only as to that
portion of the loan with respect to which a false financial statement is materially false.").
56. H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1979).
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Jones),57  the court considered how damages play into nondis-
chargeability. The debtor borrowed money from North Shore to
purchase a boat.58 Without notifying North Shore, the debtor perma-
nently relocated the boat to Florida.59 Once in Florida, the debtor also
borrowed money from other lenders, secured by the boat, without notify-
ing the other lenders of North Shore's security interest in the boat.60 In-
deed, North Shore eventually lost its security interest in the boat for
failing to refile its security interest against the boat in Florida.61 After
determining that the debtor had defrauded North Shore by failing to dis-
close the relocation of the boat, 62 the court decided that part of the debt
owed to North Shore could not be discharged in bankruptcy. 63 The court
considered precedent, determining that, though they reached different
conclusions, each "applied a consistent analysis in that they required the
creditor to show detrimental reliance as to both new cash advanced at
renewal and the foregoing of remedies to collect the original loan for the
entire debt to be found nondischargeable. ''64 Beyond simply case prece-
dent, however, the court focused on legislative history surrounding the
enactment of section 523(a)(2), which provided that:
In many cases, a creditor is required by state law to refinance ex-
isting credit on which there has been no default. If the creditor does
not forfeit remedies or otherwise rely to his detriment on a false fi-
nancial statement with respect to existing credit, then an extension,
renewal, or refinancing of credit is nondischargeable only to the ex-
tent of the new money advanced; on the other hand, if an existing
loan is in default or the creditor otherwise relies to his detriment on a
57. 88 B.R. 899 (Bank. E.D. Wisc. 1988).
58. Id. at 900.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 900-01.
61. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, as then written, required refiling a
financing statement in the new state within four months of permanently relocating the
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-103 (2005) (pre-revision).
62. N. Shore Savs., 88 B.R. at 902-03. Not every court has agreed that silence can
constitute fraudulent misrepresentation. See, e.g., Bombardier Capital, Inc. v. Baietti, 189
B.R. 549, 556 (Bankr. D. Maine 1995) (finding that debtor misappropriated creditor's
property, but refusing to find that debtor's failure to reveal sales of inventory, even if such
revelations would have led creditor to foreclose on loan, constitute fraud under section
523(a)(2)(A)). Bombardier provides an interesting example. The court acknowledged that,
had the creditor been made aware that the first boat had been sold without turning over
the proceeds to Bombardier, the subsequent sales might have been avoided because Bom-
bardier would have taken measures to prevent the unauthorized transactions. Id. at 558.
And, since other boats existed for Bombardier to repossess at the time of the misrepresen-
tation, that were no longer available by the time that Bombardier actually realized what
had happened, those misrepresentations clearly damaged Bombardier's ability to collect
upon its loan. Id. Nonetheless, the court refused to utilize section 523(a)(2) as the credi-
tor's remedy.
63. N. Shore Says., 88 B.R. at 905-06. In making its determination, the court presumed
that, had North Shore Savings been made aware of the move to Florida, it would have filed
a lien in Florida on the boat and become the second lienholder. Id. After paying off the
first lienholder, North Shore Savings would have received almost $30,000 on its debt of
nearly $45,000. Id. Thus, the $30,000 could not be discharged, but the $15,000 remaining
could be. Id. at 906.
64. Id. at 905 (emphasis added).
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false financial statement with regard to an existing loan, then the en-
tire debt is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(2)(B). This codi-
fies the reasoning expressed by the second circuit in In re Danns, 558
F.2d 114 (2nd Cir. 1977).65
The references highlighted, however, create further uncertainty. The leg-
islative statement indicates that reliance (causation) alone does not suf-
fice. The creditor must suffer a detriment as a result of the statement or
forfeit remedies. The statement then goes on to conclude that the entire
debt is nondischargeable in such a circumstance. Is Congress indicating
that the damage-the detriment-may not be discharged or saying that if
there was any detriment, the entire amount due may not be discharged?
Further, if there exists reliance on a financial statement that causes the
creditor to "forfeit remedies," must detriment even exist? In other words,
what constitutes a detriment-the damages resulting from the fraud or
waiver, or simply the waiver of an ability to foreclose upon a loan as a
result of the fraud even if no damage results? 66 Did the legislature truly
intend to provide nondischargeability in toto, even if the creditor's dam-
ages were something less than the amount of the debt, or did Congress
simply not consider that the amount of the damages might be something
less than the entirety of the debt? The answers to these questions do not
appear in the statements given, and reasonable persons can certainly dif-
fer in their interpretations of these statements.
The Household Finance Corp. v. Danns case referred to by the legisla-
tive history was one of the first circuit-court decisions in the area.67
Danns involved a loan of $2,000, obtained honestly, which was later re-
newed by a fraudulent statement that omitted $14,000 of liabilities. 68 The
Danns court, interpreting section 523(a)(2)'s predecessor, section 17a(2)
of the Bankruptcy Act, held that only "'liabilities for obtaining' exten-
sions or renewals of credit" could be denied discharge.6 9 Though the
court spoke of discharge for loans "obtained fraudulently, '70 the court
did not expand on the definition of "obtained." Thus, it left open the
possibility that a loan initially incurred honestly could be tainted by fraud
if the extension was "obtained" dishonestly. 71 The court did not discuss
65. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Statement by the Hon. Don Edwards, September
28, 1978).
66. Black's Law Dictionary defines "detriment" in terms of the "loss or harm suf-fered" or "relinquishment of some legal right that a promisee would have otherwise been
entitled to exercise." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Thus, even the legal defi-
nition of detriment wavers between a need for a mere waiver of a right and the need for
damages resulting from that waiver.
67. Danns, 558 F.2d 114, 114 (2d Cir. 1997).
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id. at 116.
70. Id.
71. At least one court has recognized that, though Danns did not absolutely prohibit
nondischargeability of renewed debt, many courts have interpreted Danns in such a man-
ner. N. Shore Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Jones (In re Jones), 88 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc.
1988) (citing Minn. Small Loan Co. v. Wright (In re Wright), 52 B.R. 27, 29 (Bankr. W.D.
Pa. 1985); Northwest Card Servs. v. Barnacle (In re Barnacle), 44 B.R. 50, 54 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1984)).
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how to calculate the damages, if such a calculation was necessary at all,
except to note that the creditor carries the burden of proving that it relied
to its detriment on the misstatement.72 Interestingly, the Bankruptcy
Code, passed one year after the Danns decision held that section 17a(2)
created nondischargeability "to the extent that the creditor could actually
have relied upon the debtor's misrepresentation," mirrors the language
from the Danns decision.73 From this statement, one cannot determine
whether the court intended only that the creditor prove reliance on the
statement74 or that the creditor show the extent of the reliance and the
damages inherent therefrom.
Before enactment of the amendment, courts often followed what came
to be known as the "new cash" rule. 75 Essentially, the "new cash" rule
provided that when (1) a debtor borrows additional money from a lender
with which the debtor has an existing relationship; (2) that lender both
grants the new loan and, essentially, renews the former loan; and (3) the
lender does so after the debtor provides fraudulent financial statements,
the new cash loan cannot be discharged, but the original loan will be dis-
charged because it was given to the debtor without any fraud.76 The ini-
tial statement of the legislative history provided above indicates that the
change to the statute deals with this multiple-loan situation. Thus, Con-
gress may have considered only the issue of whether to extend the "new
cash" rule under the revised section 523(a)(2) or to allow the original
debt to be included in nondischargeability, without considering whether
the entirety of the original debt or simply some portion of it could be
denied discharge.
C. CASE LAW INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTION 523(A)( 2 ) AND
ITS PREDECESSOR
1. Supreme Court
The only statement provided by the United States Supreme Court re-
garding the "to the extent obtained by" language of section 523(a)(2)
came in the 1995 case of Cohen v. de la Cruz.77 In Cohen, the Supreme
Court unanimously determined that punitive damages for nondischarge-
72. Danns, 558 F.2d at 116.
73. Id.
74. The court expressed obvious concern that creditors would manipulate debtors if
later fraud could render an honestly incurred debt nondischargeable:
The rule urged by HFC would encourage unscrupulous lenders making ex-
tensions on consumer loans to play down the importance of outstanding
debts or even to suggest to the applicant that he write on the application
form that he has no other debts. By inducing the naive debtor to make a false
statement, the finance company might hope to protect itself against extin-
guishment of the debt in bankruptcy.
Id.
75. See In re Peterson, 437 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (D.C. Minn. 1977) (finding that most
courts before 1977 followed the "new cash" rule, prohibiting discharge only on new loans
extended as a result of the fraud).
76. Id.
77. 523 U.S. 213 (1998).
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able fraud could not be discharged.78 The Cohen case considered the dis-
chargeability of treble damages assessed against a landlord for defrauding
his tenants.7 9 In finding that those treble damages were not dischargea-
ble, the Court focused on the language in section 523(a)(2), finding that
"[t]he most straightforward reading of § 523(a)(2)(A) is that it prevents
discharge of 'any debt' respecting 'money, property, services, or . . .
credit' that the debtor has fraudulently obtained, including treble dam-
ages assessed on account of the fraud."8 0 The court continued:
the phrase "to the extent obtained by" in § 523(a)(2)(A), as the
Court of Appeals recognized, does not impose any limitation on the
extent to which "any debt" arising from fraud is excepted from dis-
charge. "[T]o the extent obtained by" modifies "money, property,
services, or ... credit"-not "any debt"-so that the exception en-
compasses "any debt ... for money, property, services, or ... credit,
to the extent [that the money, property, services, or . . .credit is]
obtained by" fraud. The phrase thereby makes clear that the share of
money, property, etc., that is obtained by fraud gives rise to a nondis-
chargeable debt. Once it is established that specific money or prop-
erty has been obtained by fraud, however, "any debt" arising
therefrom is excepted from discharge.8 1
Under the Cohen Court's analysis, whether the debt itself was incurred
fraudulently does not matter. Rather, whether the debt resulted from
money or other value (including, of course, renewal) incurred by fraud
becomes the relevant question. 82 The opinion holds that even damages
not actually constituting the money received through fraud, if those dam-
ages are related to money obtained fraudulently, are nondischargeable. 83
The passage quoted above indicates that the fraud must not cause the
debt itself, but the credit that then leads to the debt. In the case of loan
renewal, however, those two inquiries are the same, as the amount of the
78. Id. at 218.
79. Id. at 215.
80. Id. at 218.
81. Id. (emphasis added). Though the Supreme Court did not expressly address theissue at hand here, the question of how to handle fraud after granting of an initial loan has
arisen. In Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59 (1995), the court considered the appropriate level of
reliance-reasonable or justifiable-that a creditor must have had to claim nondischargeablefraud. Ultimately, the Court required only justifiable reliance. Id. at 61. Justice Ginsburg
concurred, but added:
I concur in the Court's opinion and write separately to highlight a causation
issue still open for determination on remand: Was the debt in question, as the
statute expressly requires, "obtained by" the alleged fraud? ... Mans ulti-
mately urges that the promissory note to the Fields is, in any event, a dis-
chargeable debt because it was not "obtained by" the allegedly fraudulent
letters Mans's attorney wrote to the Fields' attorney months after the debt
was incurred. The Fields maintain that they relied on the letters to their det-
riment, in effect according Mans an extension of credit instead of invoking
the due-on-sale clause.
Id. at 78-79. Justice Ginsberg declined to share her thoughts on how to decide the question
that she raised. Id. at 79.
82. Cohen, 523 U.S. at 219-20.
83. Id. at 220.
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loan/renewal equals the debt sought by the creditor. The Cohen analysis,
indicating that all damages resulting from that fraud, even if not fraudu-
lently incurred, are nondischargeable, does not clearly apply to the fraud-
ulent-renewal situation. Treble damages clearly could have been
prevented in Cohen, if the landlord had not defrauded his tenants, the
treble damages would never have been assessed, even though treble dam-
ages were not the direct damages of the fraud. 84 The current situation
differs, though, because the damages would have existed even without the
fraud. The Cohen court even notes that nondischargeability requires a
debt that somehow "results" from the fraud:
Section 523(a) defines several categories of liabilities that are ex-
cepted from discharge, and the words "debt for" introduce many of
them .... None of these use "debt for" in the restitutionary sense of
"liability on a claim to obtain"; . . . Instead, "debt for" is used
throughout to mean "debt as a result of," "debt with respect to,"
"debt by reason of," and the like ..... .the presumption that
equivalent words have equivalent meaning when repeated in the
same statute,... has particular resonance here .... When construed
in the context of the statute as a whole, then, § 523(a)(2)(A) is best
read to prohibit the discharge of any liability arising from a debtor's
fraudulent acquisition of money, property, etc .... 85
This still does not answer the question posed. If one rewrites section
523(a)(2) in Cohen's terms, stating that "debt resulting from fraudulent
renewal of a loan" may not be nondischarged, the statement only pro-
vides a causation requirement that if the damages sought by the creditor
are linked to the fraud, they are nondischargeable. 86 Courts both before
and after Cohen have disagreed regarding how to handle a renewal
caused by fraud that does not actually cause any damage to the creditor.
2. Cases Expressly Considering Issue of Dischargeability of
Fraudulently Renewed Debt
a. Fraud in the transaction renders the entire debt
nondischargeable, even if the fraud did not cause any
damage
In Shawmut Bank v. Goodrich (In re Goodrich),87 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals considered a fraudulent incurrence and renewal of a
loan.88 The debtor originally obtained a $100,000 line of credit from the
bank.89 No fraud infected the original loan.90 The bank then renewed the
debtor's line of credit and increased it to $150,000, again without any
84. Id. at 220-21.
85. Id. at 219-21.
86. Id. at 222-23.
87. 999 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1993).





fraud involved.91 However, when the debtor twice more requested re-
newal of the line of credit, the Bank required financial statements. 92 The
debtor provided fraudulent financial statements, understating liabilities
by $9 million, and the bank granted the debtor's requests.93 When the
debtor filed for bankruptcy protection, the bank alleged that the entire
$109,000 actually borrowed against the line of credit should be deemed
nondischargeable. 94 The debtor disagreed, asking that only the $10,000
actually borrowed after submission of the fraudulent financial statements
be denied discharge. 95 In reversing the bankruptcy and district court
opinions, the First Circuit denied discharge of the entire debt.96 Clearly,
the fraud caused the bank to renew the line of credit,97 and thus, the
renewal was obtained fraudulently. The bank did not demonstrate any
damages caused by that fraud. 98 However, the First Circuit held that no
damages needed to be shown, because the explicit language of section
523(a)(2)(B) lacks a damage requirement.99 The language of section
523(a)(2)(B) instead prohibits discharge so long as a causal link exists
between the fraudulent statement and the money obtained. 100
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel dismissed the
argument that "to the extent obtained by" creates a damages require-
ment.101 In National City Bank v. Plechaty, the debtor obtained loans
from the bank for his company.102 The bank did not originally ask for
financial statements but later reconsidered and requested financial state-
ments.10 3 The debtor provided the requested statements and a personal
guaranty, but the financial statements misrepresented the debtor's finan-
cial situation.104 The loan agreement provided that the bank could call
the loan at any time. 105 Thus, the court initially considered whether the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 23-24.
94. Id. at 23.
95. Id. at 24.
96. Id.
97. Id. Though the court accepted that the bank would not have renewed but for the
fraudulent financial statements, the bank originally made the loan without asking the
debtor for any financial statements. Id. at 23. If the bank would have renewed (as opposed
to increasing the line of credit) without any financial statements, it is unclear how the court
would have responded. Providing financial statements that are not necessary could affect
the bank's reliance on those financial statements, a factor that the court clearly felt neces-
sary to establish fraud, or the bank's damages as a result of the financial statements, a
factor that the court clearly felt unnecessary. Id. at 24-25.
98. Id. at 25.
99. Id. ("Had Congress wished to add 'damage' as an element, it could easily have
done so, especially since some of the decisions favoring this requirement were issued
before the elaboration and reenactment of section 523(a)(2)(B) in 1978."); see also Wolf v.
Campbell, 211 B.R. 14, 16 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997) (quoting Goodrich, 999 F.2d at 25).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (2005).
101. 213 B.R. 119, 127-28 (6th Cir. B.A.P. 1997).
102. Id. at 121.
103. Id. at 121-22.
104. Id. at 122.
105. Id. at 121.
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bank had "extended" credit under section 523(a)(2). 10 6 Because the
debtor's misrepresentations led the bank to forego its option to call the
loan, the court held that an extension of credit did indeed occur.10 7 The
court then turned to a consideration of whether the Bank needed to show
damages. 10 8 Noting the "to the extent obtained by" language of section
523(a)(2), the court nonetheless declined to require such a showing under
section 523(a)(2)(B). 10 9
The language of the statute was considered in more detail by the Fifth
Circuit in Norris v. First National Bank (In re Norris).1" 0 In Norris, the
debtors, who incurred the loan as husband and wife but separated by the
time of the bankruptcy filing, purchased land with a loan from the
bank. 1 When the debtors sought a renewal of the loan, the husband
provided false financial statements. 11 2 Because the wife had not commit-
ted the fraud, her debt was discharged.1 13 Thus, the only issue before the
courts was that of the husband's dischargeability.1 1 4 The court held that
the husband could not discharge any of his debt to the bank:
Unlike Norris, we do not read these cases as grafting onto section
523(a)(2) a proximate causation requirement; rather, we read them
as applying the statutory mandate that qualifying debts are nondis-
chargeable "to the extent obtained by" the fraudulent documenta-
tion. In this case, because the renewal of the entire note was
"obtained by" Norris's false documentation, it is the entire note
which is excepted from discharge.1
1 5
In 1990, the issue was decided similarly by the Tenth Circuit in John
Deere Co. v. Gerlach (In re Gerlachs).116 The Gerlachs purchased equip-
ment from John Deere on credit with an agreement that, as the Gerlachs
resold the equipment, Deere would lower the outstanding balance on the
loan, even before receiving the proceeds of the sale, and extend addi-
tional credit to the Gerlachs.1 17 The Gerlachs created false sales of the
equipment in order to receive additional credit.1 1 8 The court found the
entire debt owed to John Deere to be nondischargeable.1 19 Looking at
the language of the statute, the court held that:
106. Id. at 123.
107. Id. at 124.
108. Id. at 127-28.
109. Id.
110. 70 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995).
111. Id. at 28.
112. Id. at 29.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 28-29.
115. Id. at 29 n.6. Though the court in Norris spoke of a debt "obtained by" fraud, the
actual inquiry should consider whether the money (or in this case, renewal) was obtained
by fraud. See Cohen, 523 U.S. at 219-20. However, though the renewal in Norris clearly
occurred as a result of the fraud, that does not answer the issue of whether the "to the
extent obtained by" language of section 523(a)(2) implies a damages requirement.
116. 897 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1990).
117. Id. at 1049.
118. Id. at 1049-50.
119. Id. at 1050.
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Several courts go beyond the plain meaning of the statute and pre-
clude discharge only to the extent an objecting creditor can prove
damages-reduction in the ultimate recovery on the debt caused by
forebearance.... But we will not adopt such a requirement, because
"the plain language of the statute suggests that dischargeability is an
'all or nothing' proposition.' 120
The Gerlach court recognized arguments that (1) the language "to the
extent obtained by" created a damage requirement in section 523(a)(2)
and (2) state-law fraud requires damages and thus impliedly applies to
523(a)(2). 121 The court dismissed each of these concerns.1 22 As to state
law, the court noted that the existence of fraud and the damages underly-
ing the fraud are entirely separate concerns from the dischargeability of
that debt once discovered. 123 Thus, state law determines the existence of
fraud, but it is the province of federal law to determine dis-
120. Id. at 1051 (partially quoting Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. Case, 755 F.2d 1474,
1477 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Case decision did, indeed, consider dischargeability to be an
"all or nothing" proposition, but in a slightly different manner. Case dealt with fraud in the
initial incurrence of the debt. Case, 755 F.2d at 1475. The issue presented to the court was
whether debt owed to a severely undersecured creditor (that is-a creditor whose collat-
eral was worth significantly less than the outstanding loan amount) was nondischargeable
in the entire amount of the debt, or only in the amount of the collateral. Id. at 1476-77.
The argument proposed by the debtor was that the creditor was only harmed by the fraud
to the extent of the collateral's value because the creditor would only have been able to
foreclose upon the collateral and would not have received anything on the unsecured por-
tion of its debt. Id. The court correctly disagreed. The fraud in that case did not just cause
the creditor to forebear from foreclosing-the fraud actually caused the creditor to make
the loan in the first place. Id. at 1477. But for the fraud, the creditor would never have
given up the money. Thus, the Case court's decision to hold the entire debt nondischarge-
able does not indicate a refusal to read a damage element into section 523(a)(2)(B). In-
deed, the court did not discuss the existence or non-existence of a damage element.
Instead, its discussion of damages was of the extent of the damage. Id. The opinion canjust as easily be read to include a damage requirement, but find that damages do, indeed,
exist:
We realize that the dischargeability of a fraudulently incurred debt and the
measure of damages for the underlying fraud are separate and distinct ques-
tions. Nonetheless, the Debtor argues, and we agree, that the appropriate
measure of damages for fraud does shed some light on the dischargeability
question. In the instant case, however, we cannot agree that holding the debt
nondischargeable only to the extent of the value of the collateral is sufficient
to make BTNB "whole."
Id. Thus, the "all or nothing" of dischargeability refers to whether a portion of the dam-
ages can be discharged, while another portion cannot. The court requires a determination
of the damages, but once determined, all of the damages must be treated in a like manner.
Id. This differs from the question at hand, where the entire debt can be ascertained, but
the damages attributable to fraud have not yet been ascertained. Once calculated, how-
ever, all of the damages must be treated equally, regardless of the value of the collateral
underlying.
It has been noted "that the Birmingham Trust decision is not in complete accord with the
1984 amendments to the Code and that the phrase 'to the extent obtained by' is limiting
language." Dodson v. Church (In re Church), 69 B.R. 425, 434-35 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987)
(concluding that "to the extent obtained by" requires a showing of damages, but in the
context of whether attorneys' fees are included in nondischargeable debt) (citing 3 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 523.08 (1986)).
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chargeability. 124 As to the language of section 523(a)(2), the court found
that the 1984 amendment to section 523(a)(2), which changed the lan-
guage of the code from a "debt 'for obtaining' an extension of credit by
fraud" to a "debt for extension of credit . . . 'to the extent obtained by'
fraud," actually indicated an intent to allow more debt to be nondis-
chargeable. 125 The Gerlach court did define when a debt is "obtained by"
fraud, holding that "a debt is 'obtained by' fraud if the fraud is a substan-
tial factor in the creditor's decision. '126
While the reasoning of these cases seems compelling in light of the lack
of reference to damages in section 523(a)(2)(B), the cases ignore the po-
tential windfall to the bank in such a situation. Take, for example, Mar-
quette National Bank v. Richards (In re Richards).127 The debtors
borrowed money from the bank through a line of credit and renewed the
loan multiple times based on incorrect financial statements. 128 Had the
debtors correctly represented their financial status to the bank, the bank
would not have renewed the loans.129 Finding that "[a] nondis-
chargeability action under § 523(a)(2)(B) is not an action for damages,"
the court held the entire debt to be nondischargeable.130 The court held
so, even though it recognized that "fraudulent conduct which produces no
adverse consequences to the victim, should not result in a judgment of
nondischargeability" and that "[t]he nondischargeability provisions of
§ 523 are remedial, not punitive.' 131 In essence, the court ignored the ef-
fect of its decision on these policies because section 523(a)(2)(B) does not
expressly require a determination of the damages attributable to the
fraud or false financial statement. 1 32 Interestingly, the court also indi-
cated that the debtors might be able to use the lack of damages as an
affirmative defense but did not consider it any further because the debt-
ors had not actually shown a lack of damages. 1 33
124. Id. (citing Case, 755 F.2d at 1477).
125. Id. at 1051 n.2. Interestingly, though the court used this change in the legislation
to advance its point, it later noted that "there is no reason to conclude that the 1984
amendments were anything but technical and cosmetic. We have found no legislative his-
tory reflecting that Congress intended to significantly alter the rights and obligations of
creditors and debtors governed by this section." Id.
126. Id. at 1052. More recently, the Seventh Circuit, in In re McFarland, 84 F.3d 943
(7th Cir. 1996), also interpreted the language of section 523(a)(2)(B) as requiring no dam-
age calculation. Id. at 947 (citing Norris v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Norris), 70 F.3d 27, 29
n.6 (5th Cir. 1995)). Though the court considered the phrase "to the extent obtained by," it
found that phrase to require causation, despite the fact that it felt that section 523(a)(2)(B)
already expressly required causation. Id. at 946 (citing Goodrich, 999 F.2d at 24).
127. 81 B.R. 527 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
128. Id. at 528.
129. Id. at 530.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 531, 531 n.3 (emphasis added).
132. The court spent a significant portion of the opinion discussing the element of "det-
rimental reliance" in section 523(a)(2)(B), ultimately concluding that detrimental reliance




b. Determine the effect that the fraud had on the transaction
In the 1992 case of Siriani v. Northwestern National Insurance Co. (In
re Siriani), the debtors borrowed money from a lender to purchase an
apartment building; Northwestern guaranteed the loan.134 When the
debtors renewed the loan, they also sought a renewal of the Northwest-
ern guaranty. 135 Northwestern required financial statements from the
debtors in connection with the renewal; the debtors provided false finan-
cial statements. 136 When the debtors defaulted on the original loan,
Northwestern paid pursuant to the guaranty.137  It sought nondis-
chargeability of its claim in the debtors' bankruptcy based on the fraudu-
lent financial representations. 138 After determining that a debt renewal
could create a nondischargeability claim under section 523(a)(2)(B), the
court determined that Northwestern must prove that it could have col-
lected more from the debtors at the time of the misrepresentation than it
could in the bankruptcy.' 39 In essence, the court required that a creditor
show that, had it not been defrauded, it could have sought and received
recovery from the debtor in excess of the recovery in bankruptcy. 140





139. Id. at 304-05.
140. Id. at 305-06. Though the court required that the creditor show that it could have
collected against the debtor, it stopped short of requiring a showing that the creditor would
have promptly done so:
a creditor seeking nondischargeability under section 523(a)(2)(B) must show
that it had valuable collection remedies at the time it agreed to renew its
commitment to the debtor, and that those remedies later became worth-
less. ... a creditor is not required to show that had it not renewed its commit-
ment in reliance on the debtor's fraudulent statements, it would have
exercised its collection remedies in a sufficiently timely fashion to collect the
debt; the bankruptcy court should not have imposed a "creditor's diligence"
requirement.
Id. at 305 (citing N. Shore Sav. Ass'n v. Jones (In re Jones), 88 B.R. 899, 905 (Bankr. E.D.
Wis. 1988); Household Fin. Corp. v. Greenidge (In re Greenidge), 75 B.R. 245, 247 (Bankr.
M.D. 1987); In re Gadberry, 37 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984)); Lincoln First Bank v.
Tomei (In re Tomei), 24 B.R. 204, 207 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)). Thus, the damage was not the
actual lost money to be collected, but the lost ability to collect the money. The Eighth
Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Caspers v. Van Home (In re Horne), 823 F.2d 1285
(8th Cir. 1987), a case involving a loan from the debtor's mother-in-law. When he defaulted
on the loan, his mother-in-law renewed the loan rather than suing to collect. Id. at 1286.
During the renewal, the debtor neglected to mention his intent to file for divorce from his
wife. Shortly thereafter, the debtor filed for divorce and filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 1286-
87. The mother-in-law claimed fraud as a result of the Debtor's failure to disclose the
impending divorce. Id. at 1287. The court found fraud and held that the mother-in-law's
forebearance sufficiently demonstrated damages, without the need for the mother-in-law
to show that she actually would have sued her son-in-law, or could have recovered any
money from him. Id. at 1289 ("In renewing Van Horne's entire debt, Caspers necessarily
waived any right to foreclose on the original loan when it came due. In addition, Caspers
postponed the date of maturity and altered the interest terms contained in the original
note. We are not faced with a situation in which the creditor stands to receive a windfall
under the Bankruptcy Code.").
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Interestingly, the end result in the case does not always demonstrate
the leaning of the court. For example, in the case of Norwest Financial
New Mexico, Inc. v. Ojeda,141 the typical situation occurred when the
debtor borrowed from the creditor and then borrowed additional funds
while renewing the original debt; fraud existed only in the context of the
second loan and renewal.1 42 The court ultimately found that the first loan
could be discharged in its entirety, reminiscent of the "new cash" era. 143
The court recognized that a creditor can be harmed in connection with
the first loan as a result of the fraudulent statements provided with the
second loan and renewal. 144 The Norwest court also insisted that the
creditor must prove the amount of that damage to take advantage of sec-
tion 523(a)(2)'s nondischargeability protections. 145 Ultimately, Norwest
failed in its burden of proving this damage.146 The court briefly men-
tioned prior cases and legislative history in reaching its conclusion but
provided little explanation or analysis of either.147
In Howard & Sons v. Schmidt (In re Schmidt), the debtor agreed to
purchase inventory from Howard but defaulted on his payments for the
inventory.1 48 In settling Howard's claims against the debtor, the debtor
misrepresented the value of inventory to be returned to Howard and paid
with checks on which he placed a stop-payment order.149 The court pri-
marily considered whether the fraud regarding the inventory value and
validity of the checks sufficed to invoke section 523(a)(2)'s nondis-
chargeability. 150 The court then held that only the results from the fraud
could be discharged. 151 In this case, that meant that only the damages
resulting from the release of the original claim executed by Howard in
connection with the settlement would be denied discharge:
where a Debtor, such as Schmidt, by his conduct fraudulently in-
duces a settlement agreement, the consideration received by the
Debtor must have been the receipt of actual money or tangible prop-
erty or services or the release of an underlying claim which is itself
non-dischargeable, as a direct result of the fraud, and if all that was
obtained by the Debtor was the release of a general unsecured claim
for monies due and owing which could have been discharged in bank-
ruptcy notwithstanding the mutual release, then the debtor has not
received any property of the creditor.152
141. 51 B.R. 91 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985).
142. Id. at 91.





148. 70 B.R. 634, 656 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986).
149. Id. at 636-37.
150. Id. at 641.
151. Id. at 643-44.
152. Id. at 642.
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In essence, the court assumed that, to the extent that the original claim
was dischargeable, had the fraud not occurred, the debtor would have
discharged the original claim for lack of payment on the inventory any-
way. Thus, Howard lost nothing by the fraud. Yet, the court neglects the
very reality that, even with a dischargeable claim, the creditor may lose
something. Perhaps the debtor would not have filed bankruptcy; perhaps
it had another means of making the payment. Perhaps the debtor had
collateral that could have been used to secure payment of the claim. To
assume that Howard lost nothing because the claim could have been dis-
charged really assumes that the claim would have been discharged which,
in turn, presumes that a bankruptcy would have been filed immediately
had the creditor been told the truth and that the payout on unsecured
claims at the time of that bankruptcy filing would have equalled the pay-
out on unsecured claims at the time of the actual bankruptcy filing.153
D. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
The lack of a damages element in section 523(a)(2)(B) weighs in favor
of not requiring damages. Indeed, most cases considering the issue have
felt that way. The legislative history provides little guidance in determin-
ing congressional intent in enacting and revising section 523(a)(2)(B).
The section clearly resolved the "new cash" problem-cases in which a
mere renewal of credit can never suffice for nondischargeability. That
result should occur. A creditor can be just as damaged by a fraudulent
renewal of a loan as a fraudulent giving of a loan. However, Congress
failed to indicate whether it even considered whether a calculation of the
extent of damages as a result of the renewal should be included in the
nondischargeability determination, warranting at least a consideration of
153. Though this article and many of the cases focus on what the creditor would have
received had the fraud not occurred or had it been true, some courts have used a different
basis for permitting discharge of fraudulently renewed debt. In Beneficial Finance Co. of
New York, Inc. v. McNee (In re McNee), 390 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the debtor
applied for a loan from Beneficial honestly and applied for a second loan dishonestly.
Beneficial granted the second loan and consolidated the two loans. Id. at 272. Doing so
essentially constituted a renewal of the second loan on the basis of the fraudulent financial
statements. Id. While conceivably, the court could have decided that Beneficial did not
truly rely on the fraud in renewing the original loan since it was not at the end of its term
and no financials would have been required but for the second loan application to continue
its existence, the court focused on state law, which required Beneficial to consolidate the
loans, noting that:
It is important to note that the only reason the original loan had to be rewrit-
ten was to permit Beneficial to get the additional business and comply with
Section 352(b) of the banking Law which provides that: "(b) No licensee
shall permit any loan to be split up or divided."
Id. (quoting N.Y. BANKING LAW § 352(b)). In essence, the consolidation of the loans was
not for the convenience of or at the request of the debtor. As far as the debtor was con-
cerned, he would have been equally happy (although one can assume that having the con-
solidated loans eases administrative burdens on the debtor as well as the bank) to have two
loans-one fraudulent and one not. The debtor should not be punished because of a tech-
nicality forced upon the bank by state law (or, if not required by state law, done for the
convenience of the bank). Id.
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whether section 523(a)(2)(B), as currently written and interpreted, prop-
erly supports bankruptcy policies.
a. Windfall to the creditor
One can safely assume that in most cases involving fraudulent financial
statements the lender would not have renewed if truthful financial state-
ments had been given. If the lender would have lent money with the
correct financial statements (even if the lender would have renewed a
part of the loan), the phrase "to the extent obtained by" makes it clear
that the debt should be discharged for lack of a causal relationship be-
tween the fraud and the extension of credit.
Now reconsider the situation of Sarah and Steve. When the false finan-
cial statement was provided incorrectly stating that they had insurance on
the car, what might have happened if a correct financial statement had
been given? The Bank might have required them to obtain insurance or
obtained it for them. Conversely, it might have taken the most extreme
action by calling the loan, repossessing the car, and seeking a judgment
for any amount of debt still due after the car was sold. What are the
damages to the Bank of receiving the fraudulent statement? It, in reliance
on the statement, gave up its right to repossess the car or to ensure that
the car was properly insured. By the time the bankruptcy occurred, the
car was practically worthless without any insurance proceeds to show for
it. Thus, the Bank incurred damage in the lost value of the car as a result
of the fraudulent misstatement. If section 523(a)(2)(B) does not require
damages, the Bank will be made whole because the lost car will be re-
placed by a nondischargeable damages claim for the value of outstanding
loan debt. Indeed, the Bank would be made more than whole, as its en-
tire claim, even that exceeding the value of the car, would be nondis-
chargeable. Even if damages are required, the Bank will have a
nondischargeable claim in the value of the car that it would otherwise
have had because by not having the opportunity to seek replacement in-
surance, the Bank lost the ability to secure the value of the car. Unlike
the "new cash" rule, either interpretation of current section 523(a)(2)(B)
would allow the Bank to have a nondischargeable claim on the basis of a
renewal of a loan.
Consider the difference in the second fraudulent financial statements.
What damage happened to the Bank when Sarah and Steve only failed to
disclose the car accident and pending litigation against them? In order to
determine the damages, consider what would have happened if Sarah and
Steve had told the truth. If they confessed to the Bank that Sarah had
caused an accident and that lawsuits were pending against them, almost
undoubtedly, the Bank would have called the loan immediately. What
would it have gotten then? Sarah and Steve, saddled with debt, filed
bankruptcy even when the Bank did not call the loan. The Bank calling
the loan might simply have caused an earlier bankruptcy filing, and with-
out nonexempt assets, the creditors face the unfortunate truth of having
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to write those debts off. Further, because there would not have been a
fraud (taking out of the equation for a moment the initial fraudulent
statement regarding the loss of insurance), the Bank would have had no
possibility of nondischargeability. Unfortunately for the Bank, that is the
risk of being in the business of giving loans.
Thus, in considering the two frauds perpetrated by Sarah and Steve, the
first fraud caused loss to the Bank, for the Bank could have either ob-
tained insurance or repossessed its car while the car still had value. How-
ever, the Bank likely lost nothing, except perhaps time, by Sarah and
Steve's failure to disclose the car accident. Under case law refusing to
add a damage component to section 523(a)(2), the Bank stands to receive
an extra benefit because it happened to be defrauded-payment on an
otherwise unsecured claim that the Bank would not have otherwise re-
ceived. Without any fraud, the Bank would only have received the
$10,000 from the insurance company (plus an unsecured claim for the
remainder, most or all of which would be discharged in the bankruptcy);
with nondischargeability, the Bank receives the money from the insurer
and a nondischargeable claim for the remainder.
Perhaps this extra benefit to the creditor should occur. After all, the
debtor committed fraud. However, the bankruptcy system exists for mul-
tiple purposes-both to protect creditors and to help a debtor. While not
designed to help a debtor get away with fraud, the Code balances com-
peting interests of debtors and creditors. Even to the extent that the sys-
tem protects a creditor, it should not allow a creditor to receive more
than it would otherwise have received simply by having the good fortune
of having been defrauded. Note how this differs from fraud which in-
duces a creditor to loan money in the first place. Say, for example, that
Sarah and Stephen had misstated their income when originally borrowing
money from the Bank. The entire loan would be nondischargeable, be-
cause it would never have been given but for the fraud. What does the
Bank receive by nondischargeability? The Bank returns to the position it
would have been in had no fraud occurred-it becomes whole, but not
better off, as a result of the fraud. When no damage requirement exists,
however, you open up the possibility of a Bank actually benefiting by the
fraud, rather than simply not suffering loss as a result of the fraud.
b. Discourage fraud
Of course, the Bankruptcy Code also seeks to discourage fraud. In-
deed, the Supreme Court recently recognized the need to discourage
fraud in Archer v. Warner.154 Certainly, prohibiting discharge whenever
fraud taints a transaction will serve such a purpose.
The debtor in this situation is not particularly sympathetic. The debtor
lied. Scholars have noted that to permit discharge simply because the
debt had already been incurred and would not have been paid even if no
154. 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003).
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fraud had occurred encourages debtors to be dishonest with creditors.
After all, what's the risk?' 55 In Stephen and Sarah's situation, once the
car was destroyed, they had no incentive to tell the Bank. By not disclos-
ing to the Bank, they continued to have a loan. Disclosing to the Bank
would likely push them into a bankruptcy proceeding. Without the threat
of a nondischargeable debt, they have nothing to encourage them to be
completely honest. Thus, in considering policy, it becomes readily appar-
ent that each party to the loan contract has a policy argument: preventing
a windfall to the creditor versus discouraging fraud.
c. 523(a)(2)(A) vs. 523(a)(2)(B)
The no-damages approach has the potential to treat different types of
fraud differently. Section 523(a)(2) provides for three types of fraud that
will prevent discharge of a debt: subsection (A) deals with oral fraud or
fraud not regarding financial condition, and subsection (C) deals with im-
plied fraud in the purchase of luxury items shortly before a bankruptcy
filing. Though the elements of a 523(a)(2)(B) nondischargeability claim
are expressly included in the Code, subsection (A) prohibits discharge of
debts "for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refi-
nancing of credit, to the extent obtained by ... false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud, other than a statement respecting the
debtor's or an insider's financial condition. '156 Section 523(a)(2)(A)
would include an unwritten statement of financial condition that consti-
tutes fraud, since such a statement could not be included in section
523(a)(2)(B). Even if the "to the extent obtained by" language that ap-
plies to both section 523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(2)(B) does not in-
clude a damage component, section 523(a)(2)(A)'s reference to fraud
(state-law fraud) implies a damage component. Nondischargeability
under 523(a)(2)(A) requires proving the existence of a statement made
by the debtor knowing that it was incorrect in order to defraud a creditor
who, in reliance on the falsehood, suffered damage. 157 Thus, with an un-
written fraud regarding the financial condition, section 523(a)(2)(A) re-
quires a showing of damage, but section 523(a)(2)(B), which deals with
written fraud, does not require showing of damage. However, this dis-
tinction may be acceptable. Congress created a different section for writ-
ten fraud debts because a written fraud has more inherent potential to
create reliance and damage. Thus, putting a lower burden on the affected
creditor may be fair.
155. Hon. Arthur J. Spector, Bankruptcy, 1999 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 317, 337 (1999)
("A debtor in financial straits otherwise would have no incentive to tell the truth to his
creditors.").
156. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2005).
157. Id.; Diamond v. Kolcum (In re Diamond), 285 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing
Household Credit Servs. v. Ettell (In re Ettell), 188 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 1999)); Citibank v.
Eashai (In re Eashai), 87 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Nancy C. Dreher & Matthew E.
Roy, Bankruptcy Fraud and Nondischargeability under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 69 N.D. L. REV. 57, 65 (1993) (listing the elements of a cause of action under
523(a)(2)(A)).
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In Field v. Mans, the Supreme Court recognized that section
523(a)(2)(A) and section 523(a)(2)(B) have different standards. 158 In
Field, the Court refused to apply the "reasonable reliance" standard in
(B) to (A), requiring only "justifiable reliance. ' 159 Field provides an in-
teresting exercise in statutory interpretation, however. One unsuccessful
argument in the Field case involved the principle of statutory interpreta-
tion that if, in one statute, the legislature included a standard in one sec-
tion of the statute, but not in another section, the lack of that standard in
the latter section is presumed to be intentional. The Court found that
applying such a presumption in section 523(a)(2)(A) would mean that no
reliance was necessary because such a standard had not been included.
The Court was unwilling to use this "negative pregnant" presumption to
find no requirement of reliance in section 523(a)(2)(A). In so doing, the
Court indicated that reliance must be a part of a fraud determination,
even if not expressly included in the statute.' 60 Though not dealing with
158. 516 U.S. 59, 68 (1995).
159. Id. at 61.
160. Id. at 66-67. The Court stated that:
They contend that the addition to § 523(a)(2)(B) alone supports an inference
that, in § 523(a)(2)(A), Congress did not intend to require reasonable reli-
ance, over and above actual reliance. But this argument is unsound. The ar-
gument relies on the apparent negative pregnant, under the rule of
construction that an express statutory requirement here, contrasted with stat-
utory silence there, shows an intent to confine the requirement to the speci-
fied instance. . . . Thus the failure of § 523(a)(2)(A) to require the
reasonableness of reliance demanded by § 523(a)(2)(B) shows that (A) lacks
such a requirement. Without more, the inference might be a helpful one. But
there is more here, showing why the negative pregnant argument should not
be elevated to the level of interpretive trump card. First, assuming the argu-
ment to be sound, the most it would prove is that the reasonableness stan-
dard was not intended. But our job does not end with rejecting
reasonableness as the standard. We have to discover the correct standard,
and where there are multiple contenders remaining (as there are here), the
inference from the negative pregnant does not finish the job.
Though the court rejected the "negative pregnant" presumption, the case differs from the
situation herein in that the consequences of the assumption would create more integral
problems with the statute. The comparison of the general language of section 523(a)(2)(A)
to the specific requirements of section 523(a)(2)(B) creates a number of "negative preg-
nant" assumptions which, essentially, do away with any requirements in section
523(a)(2)(A), a problem not found when the implied requirements of section 523(a)(2)(A)
are used to invalidate an implied requirement in section 523(a)(2)(B):
If the negative pregnant is the reason that § 523(a)(2)(A) has no reasonable-
ness requirement, then the same reasoning will strip paragraph (A) of any
requirement to establish a causal connection between the misrepresentation
and the transfer of value or extension of credit, and it will eliminate scienter
from the very notion of fraud. Section 523(a)(2)(B) expressly requires not
only reasonable reliance but also reliance itself; and not only a representa-
tion but also one that is material; and not only one that is material but also
one that is meant to deceive. Section 523(a)(2)(A) speaks in the language
neither of reliance nor of materiality nor of intentionality. If the contrast is
enough to preclude a reasonableness requirement, it will do as well to show
that the debtor need not have misrepresented intentionally, the statement
need not have been material, and the creditor need not have relied. But com-
mon sense would balk. If Congress really had wished to bar discharge to a
debtor who made unintentional and wholly immaterial misrepresentations
having no effect on a creditor's decision, it could have provided that. It
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the requirement of damages, the same argument could apply with regard
to damages. In other words, though the presumption would indicate that,
because Congress did not include a damages component to the statute,
damages are not required, the Field decision reminds us that the statutory
presumptions are not absolute.
So how should the court or the legislature balance these competing
policy interests in either interpreting or redrafting section 523(a)(2)(B)?
First, focus on the reason for the exception to discharge.16 1 As noted,
some discharge exceptions are designed to ensure payment of a particular
type of debt despite bankruptcy, even if the debtor did nothing wrong
(for example, child support or taxes). In these situations, the Bankruptcy
Code aims to put the creditor in the same position that the creditor would
have been but for the bankruptcy filing. The remaining exceptions are
designed to ensure payment to a creditor who has been wronged by the
debtor. In these situations, the goal of the Bankruptcy Code should be to
put the creditor in the same position that the creditor would have been
but for the wrongdoing. Creditors with these types of debt (for example,
contract debt) run the risk of not being paid in a bankruptcy. Society
does not place on them the burden of the wrongdoing, in this case, the
fraud. To allow the creditor to be in the position that the creditor would
have been in but for the fraud and but for the bankruptcy does more than
make the creditor whole. It actually rewards a creditor for having been
the victim of the bad act and becomes punitive rather than remedial
1 62
III. CALCULATING DAMAGES
Even if one agrees that damages must be calculated, the actual calcula-
tion of those damages creates another area of uncertainty. Damages may
be calculated in a number of ways, but one of two options are tradition-
ally used. The court may use a "benefit of the bargain" analysis, in which
the creditor enjoys the same position that the creditor would have been in
had the false statement been true. 163 Contract-based actions favor such
an approach. 164 The "benefit of the bargain" analysis has support in tort
law, even as applied in the bankruptcy courts. In Castner Knott Co. v.
Wilson (In re Wilson),165 the court considered how to calculate damages
on fraudulently-incurred credit card debt. Though not dealing with the
would, however, take a very clear provision to convince anyone of anything
so odd, and nothing so odd has ever been apparent to the courts that have
previously construed this statute, routinely requiring intent, reliance, and ma-
teriality before applying § 523(a)(2)(A).
Id. at 67-68.
161. See supra, notes 23-24.
162. See supra, note 107.
163. COMMERCIAL DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BUSINESS LITIGATION 1.03
(2004).
164. J.F. Rydstrom, Comment Note, "Out of Pocket" or "Benefit of Bargain" as Proper
Rule of Damages for Fraudulent Representations Inducing Contract for the Transfer of
Property, 13 A.L.R. 3D 875, § 2(a) (2004).
165. 12 B.R. 363 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981).
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question of an honestly incurred debt fraudulently renewed, the court
considered many similar issues. The court started with the basic premise
that "a creditor's recovery is governed by the appropriate measure of
damages in tort actions. ' 166 The debtor argued for limiting damages to
only the value of the goods that the debtor had received, less than half of
the actual debt incurred. 167 The court agreed with the creditor that dam-
ages should represent the benefit of the bargain, defining that phrase to
mean what the creditor would have received had the debtor lived up to
his or her representations.1 68 The debtor borrowed over $2,300 on credit,
promising to pay it back, and should be bound by that promise. 169 In the
fraudulent renewal context, this approach often eliminates the calculation
of damages. The creditor loaned money on the basis that the fraudulent
statement was true. Presumably, the financial statements indicated that
the debtor could repay the obligations in full. Thus, any money loaned
out (or any renewal of credit) would constitute damages under such an
approach, leaving no need to "calculate" damages at all. Essentially, such
an approach would equate to a standard whereby once fraud exists, the
entire loan becomes nondischargeable. 170
Alternatively, the court may opt for an "out-of-pocket" analysis, in
which the creditor returns to the same position that the creditor would
have been had the fraudulent statement not been made. 171 Though fraud
actions typically invoke an "out-of-pocket" analysis, 172 courts frequently
waiver from this standard when a contract action serves as the basis for
the fraud claim. 173 The Castner Knott court looked at this approach for
166. Id. at 365.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 366, 369.
169. Id. at 366 (citing 37 AM. JUR. 2d § 353 ("Essentially (t)his rule compels the party
guilty of fraud to make good his representations, and under its operation the parties are
placed in the same position as if the contract and representations had been fully per-
formed")); cf Howenstein v. Freeman (In re Freeman), 142 B.R. 758 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1991) (limiting nondischargeability to damages).
170. Consider, however, the situation in Goodnow v. Adelman (In re Adelman), 90 B.R.
1012 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1988), in which the Debtor purchased inventory on credit from Good-
now. When Debtor failed to pay for the inventory, he promised a lien on all of the inven-
tory, and promised to file a financing statement reflecting Goodnow's security interest in
the inventory with the state. The Debtor never filed the financing statement. A bank had
properly perfected its security interest against Debtor's inventory, and took all of it
through the bankruptcy proceeding, leaving Goodnow unsecured. Goodnow, 90 B.R. at
1016. Though the court found fraud, and thus nondischargeability, the court held that
Goodnow was not entitled to any damages as a result of the fraud claim. In so deciding, the
court focused on what Goodnow would have received had the fraudulent statement been
true. Because the Bank's security interest in the inventory was perfected before Debtor
made the fraudulent statement, Goodnow was not harmed by the fraud. Goodnow would
have been second to the Bank in priority and would have received nothing anyway. Id. at
1022-23.
171. COMMERCIAL DAMAGES: A GUIDE TO REMEDIES IN BUSINESS LITIGATION 1.03
(2004).
172. Rydstrom, supra note 164, 13 A.L.R. 3d 875, § 2(a).
173. Id. §§ 2(a), 3(a). The Rydstrom article gives case citations from across the country
indicating how various states treat such questions of fraud in contract. Id. § 2(a). States
clearly disagree on how to treat this issue. Though one concern would be that, to the extent
that bankruptcy courts borrow from state damage calculations and states are not consis-
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calculating tort damages. 174 In rejecting the rule, the court recognized
that the "out-of-pocket" rule, which typically yields lower damages than
the "benefit-of-the-bargain" rule, does not provide an incentive for a
debtor not to commit fraud.
175
State law regarding how to handle fraud-in-contract claims varies
widely. 176 Even if one assumes that most states apply a "benefit of the
bargain" analysis to such claims, there are a number of reasons why bank-
ruptcy courts should not do so. First, it undermines the very essence of
bankruptcy law-a balance between protection of creditors and the fresh
start of debtors. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the bank-
ruptcy court has jurisdiction to deal with dischargeability-not state law.
In other words, state law determines the existence of fraud, but the bank-
ruptcy court determines the effect that the fraud would have on the
debt. 177 Second, states have a number of reasons why they may favor
"benefit of the bargain," including favoring the victim of the fraud over
the perpetrator, providing that a perpetrator of fraud pay at least as much
in damages as one who does not, and preventing fraud by ensuring that
the perpetrator actually suffers as a result of the fraud. 178 However,
these reasons are less compelling in bankruptcy court. Bankruptcy en-
ables the debtor to recover from financial distress. The idea that a debtor
would be better off committing fraud than honestly breaching a contract
is quite compelling in state court. After all, an honest party to a contract
who breaches pays damages under a "benefit of the bargain" analysis; but
by including some fraud, the party could potentially pay only under "out-
of-pocket" ideas. But such a distinction does not apply in bankruptcy
because an honest debtor receives a discharge and does not pay out ex-
pectancy damages on a contract. Finally, the action in question involves
nondischargeability completely based in tort. If the action were just a
breach of contract, all of the damages would be dischargeable (absent
another exception to discharge under the Bankruptcy Code). The credi-
tor uses fraud to create a nondischargeable debt and should be bound by
the damages applicable to such fraud. The creditor should not be able to
tent, bankruptcy courts will likewise not be consistent. However, the Supreme Court has
recognized that bankruptcy courts must only apply consistent standards (such as following
state law), not necessarily be consistent as to which law they apply. Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188-89 (1902).
174. Castner Knott Co. v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 12 B.R. 366 (Bankr. Tenn. 1981).
175. Citing to 37 AM. JUR. 2D § 356, the court stated that the out-of-pocket damage
calculation:
does not discourage fraud, since the fraudulent party takes no chance of los-
ing anything because of his fraud: if he is not called to account, he enjoys his
plunder; if he is called to account, he merely gives back what was not right-
fully his, and thus is no worse for the fraud. It has been said in this respect
that if active fraud is to carry no greater penalty than to make price and value
agree, honesty will not be much encouraged.
Id.
176. Rydstrom, supra note 164, 13 A.L.R. 3d 875, § 2(a).
177. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 283-84 (1991).
178. Rydstrom, supra note 164, 13 A.L.R. 3d 875, § 2(a) (citing United States v. Ben
Grunstein & Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (N.J. 1955)).
2005] No Harm, No Foul 1417
SMU LAW REVIEW
use tort principles to create nondischargeability and contract principles to
determine the amount of the nondischargeable claim. The nondischarge-
able claim is either a tort or a contract.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Bankruptcy law presumes that a debtor receives a fresh start, including
the discharge of debts. Indeed, a strong presumption against nondis-
chargeability exists. 179 The inclusion of a damage component is central to
create a balance between this strong presumption and the Code's desire
to protect creditors who have been wronged. Given that fraud nondis-
chargeability intends to make the creditor "whole," rather than to protect
a particular type of creditor, the damages permitted should be only those
needed to make the creditor "whole." Including a requirement that dam-
ages be shown and that those damages be calculated on the basis of what
the creditor actually lost better ensures this needed balance. Creditors
actually harmed by fraud should be protected by nondischargeability.
Conversely, those creditors not actually harmed by the fraud should not
enjoy the benefits of nondischargeability just by happenstance of being a
fraud "victim." Such a rule does, in some cases, allow the most desperate
of debtors to "get away with" fraud by failing to provide an incentive not
to commit the fraud. But in the balance between desperate debtors and
creditors, desperate debtors should win absent compelling reasons to
favor the creditor. No one wants fraud, but the bankruptcy system's pri-
mary goal is an equitable distribution of assets. Allowing nondis-
chargeability only for the true harm done to the creditor strikes a balance
needed to protect the creditor while still allowing the debtor the funda-
mental fresh start inherent in a bankruptcy proceeding. In so doing, the
Code ensures that the creditors are neither burdened nor blessed by the
existence of a bankruptcy proceeding.
179. Boston Univ. v. Mehta (In re Mehta), 310 F.3d 308, 311 (3d Cir. 2002).
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